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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Court has jurisdiction in this case pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Issue: Did the trial court properly determine, in the context of an accord and 
satisfaction, that a Utah creditor cannot ignore and/or unilaterally alter the express terms 
of a debtor's tender of monies in full settlement of a disputed debt by cashing the debtor's 
check and then further pursuing the debtor for payment on the balance that the creditor 
alone contends is owed?1 
Standard of review: To the extent an appellate court's review of a trial court's 
order granting a motion to dismiss presents questions of law, the appellate court reviews 
the trial court's conclusions for correctness, paying no particular deference to the trial 
court's conclusion. See Promax Dev. Corp. v. Raile, 2000 UT 4, \ 17, 998 P.2d 254, 259 
(Utah 2000); S & GInc. v. Intermountain Power Agency, 913 P.2d 735, 738 (Utah 1996). 
However, the appellate court must "assume that the trial court believed those aspects of 
the evidence which may be deemed to support its finding and judgment" and must 
"survey the evidence in the light favorable thereto." Tates, Inc. v. Little America Refining 
Co., 535 P.2d 1228, 1229 (Utah 1975). 
1
 Contrary to Rule 24(a)(5)(A) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, Appellant ECO 
Marketing, Inc.'s Brief failed to provide any record citation demonstrating ECO's 
preservation of the issue, as raised in ECO's Brief, regarding the trial court's legal 
conclusion, based on its Findings of Fact, that there clearly "exists in this matter a bona 
fide dispute over an unliquidated amount of money." See Third District Court Case No. 
010911612 Record at 68-69. Nor does ECO's Brief provide "a statement of grounds for 
seeking review of an issue not preserved in the trial court." UTAH R. APP. P. 24(a)(5)(B). 
Waiver of Issues: In neither ECO's Docketing Statement (p.3, ^ 8) nor Statement 
of Issue (Brief of the Appellant at 1-2) did ECO raise the issue whether there existed a 
bona fide dispute between the parties as to the amount owed under the parties' contracts. 
Further, ECO failed to argue this issue to the trial court, see R. at 85, or raise the issue in 
its Memorandum in Opposition to Motion for Summary Affirmance. Therefore, ECO 
should be deemed to have waived the bona fide dispute issue, which is the first prong of 
the accord and satisfaction inquiry. See Estate Landscape & Snow Removal Specialists, 
Inc. v. Mountain States Tel & Tel Co., 844 P.2d 322, 325 (Utah 1992) (referencing three 
elements of an accord and satisfaction). Moreover, ECO conceded that Hardesty 
tendered payment in full satisfaction of the entire dispute, which eliminates the second 
accord and satisfaction element as an issue on appeal. See Brief of Appellant at 7; R. at 
37; see also ECO's Memorandum in Opposition to Motion for Summary Affirmance at 
2-3. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, RULES 
There are no constitutional provisions, statutes, ordinances, rules, or regulations 
whose interpretation is determinative of the appeal or of central importance to the appeal. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
I. Proceedings Before the Trial Court 
ECO filed a complaint in this matter on December 20, 2001, alleging claims for 
breach of contract, promissory estoppel, unjust enrichment, interference with actual and 
potential economic relations and seeking a preliminary injunction. See Third District 
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Court Case No. 010911612 Record at 1-18.2 In response, pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of 
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, on February 25, 2002, Hardesty timely filed a Motion 
to Dismiss and memorandum of points and authorities in support thereof in which 
Hardesty argued the parties reached an accord and satisfaction of the disputed debt. R. at 
19-34. Following the parties' briefing of the various issues raised by Hardesty's Motion 
to Dismiss, the trial court heard oral argument on the dispositive motion on June 12, 
2002, after which the court took the matter under advisement. See R. at 62-65. 
On June 28, 2002, the trial court held a telephonic hearing with the parties' 
respective counsel during which the court granted Hardesty's Motion to Dismiss and 
ordered Hardesty's counsel to prepare an order consistent with the trial court's ruling. R. 
at 66. The trial court entered its Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law & Order Granting 
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss on July 29, 2002. R. at 67-71. ECO filed its Notice of 
Appeal on August 21, 2002. R. at 72-73. 
II. Appellate Court Proceedings 
On September 11, 2002, ECO filed its Docketing Statement with the Utah 
Supreme Court, which prompted Hardesty's filing of an Opposition to Appellant's 
Statement Regarding Decision of Case by the Utah Supreme Court on September 24, 
2002. Also on September 24, 2002, pursuant to Rules 10(a) and 33 of the Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure, Hardesty filed with the Utah Supreme Court a Motion for Summary 
Affirmance & Award of Attorney Fees and Costs. Following the parties' briefing on 
2
 Hereinafter, all citation references to the Record in Third District Court Case No. 
010911612 are abbreviated as "R." followed by the relevant page number(s). 
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Hardesty's summary affirmance and attorney fees motion, the Utah Supreme Court 
transferred this matter to the Utah Court of Appeals for disposition pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-2-2(4). On October 31, 2002, the Utah Court of Appeals, by and through the 
Honor ible Norman H. Jackson, ordered that Hardesty's motion for summary affirmance 
wts "denied and deferred pending plenary presentation and consideration of the appeal." 
Thereafter, pursuant to the briefing schedule issued by the Clerk of the Utah Court of 
Appeals, ECO filed its Brief of the Appellant on December 17, 2002. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
L On or about June 11, 2001, the parties entered a contract, the "Agreement 
Between Founders of Business Pricing Systems, L.L.C." (hereinafter "Founders 
Agreement"), whereby the costs of the parties' venture were divided equally between the 
parties, while profits from distribution were divided 51% to Hardesty and 49% to ECO. 
See R. at 68, f 1; R. at 10-12; see also ECO's Docketing Statement at 2, f 7(a). 
2. On April 19, 2001, the parties entered a Consulting Agreement whereby 
ECO agreed to "abate the amount of Five Thousand Dollars ($5,000.00) of operating 
expenses per month for a period of three months (March, April and May of 2001) from 
the existing program already under contract between the [parties]." See R. at 68, f 2; R. 
at 30-31; see also ECO's Docketing Statement at 2, f 7(b). 
3* In August 2001 the parties agreed to terminate their business relationship. 
See R. at 68, If 3; R. at 3, f 14; R. at 55-56, f 3; ECO's Docketing Statement at 2, If 7(c). 
4. The parties dispute whether an agreement was reached as to the amount 
owed to ECO from Hardesty following the dissolution of their business relationship. See 
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R. at 68, lpp-6; compare R. at 35, ff 1-2, oMR. at 1-2, fflf 3-4, with R. at 47-48, fflf 1&2, 
and R. at 55-56, ffif 3-4; see a/so ECO's Docketing Statement at 2, f 7(c). 
5. On August 24, 2001, ECO prepared an Invoice to Hardesty requesting 
payment of $24,700.00. See R. at 15; see also ECO's Docketing Statement at 2, \ 7(c). 
The invoice included a charge for telephone, web-chat, e-mail and VOIP operational 
costs of $29,700.00 and a deduction of $5,000.00 for "Credit toward service performed," 
which constituted a partial abatement under the terms of the Consulting Agreement. See 
id. 
6. On August 30, 2001, Hardesty met with Brad Isom ("Isom") and David 
Clark ("Clark") of ECO in the ECO conference room. See R. at 47, If 1; R. at 55-56, fl 3. 
There, the parties discussed their mutual decision to terminate the Business Pricing 
Systems partnership, which was established by the "Agreement Between Founders of 
Business Pricing Systems, L.L.C." Id. During the conversation, the parties went through 
the costs of the project and agreed that the direct costs were $13.50 per hour and that 
there were a total of 2,200 payroll hours spent on the project. Id At no time during the 
meeting did Hardesty agree to pay ECO $24,700.00. Id. However, during the meeting 
Hardesty did tell Isom and Clark that he would try to pay them what he owed within a 
couple of weeks, without committing to any specific dollar amount. Id. 
7. In early October 2001, Isom called Hardesty at Hardesty's home office. R. 
at 48-49, f 3; R. at 56-57, ^ 5. During the call, Isom asked Hardesty whether he had sent 
a payment to ECO. Id. Hardesty confirmed a payment had been sent, but there was no 
discussion of the amount of said payment. Id. During the conversation the parties 
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discussed die stock market, and that Hardesty's stock holdings were negatively affected 
by the events of September 11, 2001, which had ruined Hardesty's original plans to 
establish a line of credit through American Express for Business Pricing Systems. Id. At 
no time during this conversation did Hardesty tell Isom that Hardesty was liquidating 
assets to pay ECO or that he was arranging a line of credit through American Express to 
pay any amount to ECO by September 17, 2001. Id 
8. On October 5, 2001, Hardesty wrote to ECO forwarding a check in the 
amount of $3,394.72. See R. at 68, f 4; R. at 16 & 32; see also ECO's Docketing 
Statement at 2, f 7(d). In his letter, Hardesty explained the check was tendered as foil 
payment for any and all amounts due to ECO based on the parties' contracts: 
This check represents foil and final payment, satisfying all conditions 
existing between eCo. Marketing, Inc, and Business Pricing Systems 
(DBA). Endorsement and deposit of foil and final payment indicates a foil 
release of interests and liabilities between eCo. Marketing, Inc. and 
Business Pricing Systems (DBA). 
See id.; see also R. at 85 (p.6, 11. 12-14; p. 15, 11.15-21). Hardesty also explained the 
amount of the check equaled the total amount ECO claimed to be owed ($29,700.00), less 
ECO's one-half of the expenses ($15,000.00), less the $15,000.00 abatement owed under 
the terms of the Consulting Agreement, plus 49% of the $6,928.00 owed to ECO under 
the terms of the Founders Agreement. See id; see also R. at 85 (p. 19, 11. 7-11) 
(conceding Hardesty was entitled to a credit based on the contracts). 
9. On October 17, 2001, Isom again telephoned Hardesty at his home office. 
R. at 49, f 4; R. at 57, f 6. From the beginning of the conversation, Isom was livid about 
the October 5, 2001 letter Hardesty sent to ECO tendering the $3,394.72 settlement 
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check. See R. at 16 & 32. Without success, Hardesty tried to explain the basis for his 
calculation was set forth in the October 5, 2001 letter. R. at 49,1f 4; R. at 57, If 6. 
10. In response to ECO Marketing's e-mail, dated October 17, 2001, at no time 
did Hardesty agree to ECO's unilateral alteration of the terms of his October 5, 2001 
settlement letter. R. at 49, % 5; R. at 57, f 7. 
11. Thereafter, ECO endorsed and deposited Hardesty's check. See R. at 68, f 
6; R. at 34; R. at 17; & ECO's Docketing Statement at 3, f 7(f). In doing so, ECO noted 
in its endorsement, "without waiver of rights reserved per our 10/17/01 email." Id.; see 
also R. at 85 (p.7,11. 18-25; p.8,11. 1-3; p. 11,11. 6-10). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Under Utah law, once a debtor tenders a check under the condition that negotiation 
of the check will constitute full settlement of a disputed debt between the parties, then the 
creditor's negotiation of that check, regardless of any and all efforts by the creditor to 
negate the conditions under which the check was tendered, constitutes an accord and 
satisfaction as a matter of law. In this case, it is beyond argument that there exists a bona 
fide dispute between the parties as to the amount Hardesty allegedly owed to ECO upon 
the parties' dissolution of their business relationship. In this context, Hardesty tendered a 
check to ECO accompanied by a letter explaining that ECO's negotiation of the check 
would constitute full and final payment. Thereafter, despite objecting to Hardesty's 
tender, ECO ignored the express terms of the tender offer set forth in Hardesty's letter 
and cashed Hardesty's check. Under these facts there exists an accord and satisfaction as 
7 
( 
a matter of law and, therefore, the trial court properly granted Hardesty's Motion to 
Dismiss. < 
ARGUMENT 
I. The Trial Court's Findings of Fact Must Be Affirmed Because ECO Failed to 
Properly Marshal the Evidence i 
When challenging a trial court's findings of fact, an appellant has a duty to 
marshal the evidence in favor of the trial court's findings, which ECO failed to do. As 
this Court explained in Moon v. Moon, 973 P.2d 431, 437 f 24 (Utah Ct. App. 1999), the 
duty to marshal the evidence is not to be taken lightly: 
The marshaling process is not unlike becoming the devil's advocate. 
Counsel must extricate himself or herself from the client's shoes and fully 
assume the adversary's position. In order to properly discharge the duty of 
marshaling the evidence, the challenger must present, in comprehensive and 
fastidious order, every scrap of competent evidence introduced at trial 
which supports the very findings the appellant resists. After constructing 
this magnificent array of supporting evidence, the challenger must ferret out 
a fatal flaw in the evidence. The gravity of this flaw must be sufficient to 
convince the appellate court that the court's finding resting upon the 
evidence is clearly erroneous. 
Id at 437, f 24 (quoting West Valley City v. Majestic Inv. Co., 818 P.2d 1311, 1315 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1991)). The court further noted that "[w]hen an appellant fails to meet the 
'"heavy burden'" of marshaling the evidence, . . . '"we assume[] that the record supports 
the findings of the trial court.'" Id. (quoting Wade v. Stangl, 869 P.2d 9, 12 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1994) (second citation omitted) (second alteration in original)). 
In the present matter, the trial court made the following Findings of Fact: 
1. On or about June 11, 2001, the parties entered a contract 
regarding a joint business venture between Plaintiff and Defendant, namely 
Business Pricing Systems. 
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2. The parties also entered a contract on April 19, 2001, 
whereby Defendant agreed to provide consulting services to Plaintiff. 
3. During or about August 2001, the parties agreed to terminate 
their professional association. In this context, on or about August 27, 2001, 
Plaintiff prepared an Invoice to Defendant requesting payment of 
$24,700.00, which Plaintiff alleged it is owed by Defendant pursuant to the 
parties' various agreements. 
4. On or about October 5, 2001, Defendant sent Plaintiff a check 
in the amount of $3,394.72 along with a letter which stated the check 
"represents full and final payment, satisfying all conditions existing 
between" Plaintiff and Defendant. Defendant's letter explained 
Defendant's calculations were based on the parties' contracts and that, 
"Endorsement and deposit of full and final payment indicates a full release 
of interests and liabilities between" Plaintiff and Defendant. 
5. On or about October 17, 2001, Plaintiff sent an e-mail to 
Defendant advising Defendant that his proffered payment of $3,394.72 was 
inadequate and would be accepted only and partial payment of the amount 
owed. 
6. On or about October 30, 2001, Plaintiff endorsed the 
Defendant's check, "without waiver, rights reserved per our 10/17/01 
email." Plaintiff thereafter deposited said check. 
R. at 68. From these Findings of Fact, which are fully supported by the Record evidence, 
it is abundantly clear that not only did the parties have a bona fide dispute as to the 
amount owed, but also that an accord and satisfaction exists as a matter of law. 
Nonetheless, ECO made no attempt in its brief to marshal the numerous record 
citations supporting the trial court's factual findings, not even its own concurrence 
therewith. See, e.g., R. at 23, f 4; R. at 32 (October 5, 2001, letter setting forth 
Hardesty's contract-based calculation of the amount owed); R. at 47-52 (setting forth 
facts and explaining Hardesty never agreed to amount that ECO alleged was owed); R. at 
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55-57 (Affidavit of Robert Hardesty confirming disagreement as to amount ECO alleged 
was owed), R. at 85 (p.7, 11. 8-10) ("Court: I think you all agree on what occurred. 
There's no dispute about that." "Mr. Epperson: Right."). 
Instead, by ignoring the trial court's findings and the Record evidence, ECO's 
brief repeatedly, though erroneously, suggests there was complete agreement on the 
amount owed. See, e.g., ECO's Brief of the Appellant at 4, 5, & 7. In the Moon case, 
where "in his zeal to focus on and argue the facts" and "re-argue[] his own evidence," the 
appellant neglected to first marshal the evidence, this Court simply affirmed the trial 
court's findings of fact. 973 P.2d at 436 & 437. In this case, the trial court's Findings of 
Fact should similarly be affirmed based on ECO's complete failure to marshal the 
evidence in favor of the trial court's findings. 
n . All Elements of an Accord and Satisfaction Are Met 
The parties reached an accord and satisfaction and, therefore, the trial court 
properly granted Hardesty's Motion to Dismiss ECO's Complaint. In Utah, there are 
three elements of an accord and satisfaction: "(i) a bona fide dispute over an unliquidated 
amount; (ii) a payment tendered in full settlement of the entire dispute; and (iii) an 
acceptance of the payment." Estate Landscape & Snow Removal Specialists, Inc. v. 
Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co., 844 P.2d 322, 325 (Utah 1992); Promax Dev. Corp. v. 
Raile, 2000 UT 4, t 20, 998 P.2d 254, 259 (Utah 2000); Dishinger v. Potter, 2001 UT 
App 209, If 19, 47 P.3d 76, 80 (Utah Ct. App.), cert, denied, 40 P.3d 1135 (Utah 2001); 
see also UTAH CODE ANN. § 70A-3-311(l) (2001) (setting forth same three criteria for 
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accord and satisfaction by use of a negotiable instrument). All three elements were 
satisfied in this case. 
A. The Parties Had a Bona Fide Dispute Over an Unliquidated Amount3 
In Estate Landscape, the Utah Supreme Court enunciated the standard applied in 
determining the existence of a "bona fide dispute" as to an unliquidated amount: "There 
must be a good-faith disagreement over the amount due under the contract. The 
disagreement need not be well-founded, so long as it is in good faith.5'4 Id. at 326; see 
also S&G Inc. v. Intermountain Power Agency, 913 P.2d 735, 739 (Utah 1996). In this 
case, Hardesty's dispute with ECO as to the amount owed is both well-founded and in 
good faith as his calculations are based entirely upon the contracts between the parties. 
The Founders Agreement clearly indicates the parties would split losses from 
operations on a 50/50 basis and that profits from disposition would be split 51/49 in 
Hardesty's favor based on his 51% ownership of Business Pricing Systems. R. at 10. 
Accordingly, from the $29,700.00 ECO claimed it was owed, ECO was responsible for 
one half of such amount as the figure represents operating expenses of Business Pricing 
Systems. Further, pursuant to the Consulting Agreement, Hardesty was entitled to a 
3
 Though Hardesty contends ECO has waived this issue, it is nevertheless addressed 
because ECO's appellate brief argument cursorily addresses the issue. 
4
 The Utah Supreme Court also recognized, "even if a claim is undisputed and liquidated, 
parties can still discharge their obligations through accord and satisfaction." Estate 
Landscape, 844 P.2d at 326. As the court explained: "In such instances, however, the 
parties must support the accord with separate consideration. . . . In cases like the one 
before us, where there is no separate consideration, the parties' surrender of their legal 
right to dispute the amount at issue supplies the consideration necessary to support the 
accord." Id. (citation omitted). 
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$15,000.00 deduction constituting the $5,000.00 per month abatement of operating 
expenses for March, April, and May 2001. R. at 30. Finally, pursuant to the terms of the 
Founders Agreement, ECO was entitled to 49% of the $6,928.00 in total cash retained by 
Business Pricing Systems, namely, $3,394.72, which is exactly the amount tendered by 
Hardesty as explained in his October 5, 2001, letter to ECO. See R. at 10; see also R. at 
16 & 32. Thus, based on the relevant documents, Hardesty's position that ECO was 
owed a total amount of $3,394.72 is both well-founded and in good faith, thereby 
satisfying the first element of accord and satisfaction.5 
B. Appellee Tendered Payment in Full Settlement of Entire Dispute 
The second accord and satisfaction element, tender of payment in settlement of the 
full amount of the disputed sum, is undisputed. See Brief of Appellant at 7; R. at 3. In 
Estate Landscape, the Utah Supreme Court addressed a factual scenario similar to that 
involved in the present case: In November 1984, Mountain Bell hired Estate Landscape 
to provide snow removal services. 844 P.2d at 324. Following the winter, Estate 
Landscape sent Mountain Bell a bill for $30,162.50, itemizing its snow removal services 
for the season. Id. Mountain Bell opposed the total amount Estate Landscape claimed it 
was owed, and therefore prepared a check to Estate Landscape in the amount of 
$8,613.00—the check itself did not indicate that negotiating the check would result in an 
accord and satisfaction. Id. On June 21, 1985, Mountain Bell sent the reduced amount 
check to Estate Landscape without any explanatory letter. Id. Thereafter, on June 28, 
5
 Meanwhile, ignoring the contracts between the parties, ECO presented the trial court no 
explanation of the calculations it made to arrive at the amount it purports Hardesty owes. 
If anything, ECO's position is neither well-founded nor in good faith. 
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1985, Mountain Bell sent Estate Landscape a letter setting forth the basis for the reduced 
amount of the check tendered and conditioning Estate Landscape's negotiation of the 
check on its agreement to settlement of the disputed amount: 
Based on the above identified billing descrepancies [sic] we have enclosed 
a check for $8,613.00 which is payment in full for satisfaction of contracted 
services. If you are not willing to accept that sum, $8613.00 in full 
satisfaction of the sums due, DO NOT negotiate the check, for upon your 
negotiation of that check, we will treat the matter as fully paid. 
Id. at 324-25. Estate Landscape negotiated the check on October 28, 1985, and pursued 
litigation to recover the purported remaining balance of $21,549.50. Based on these 
facts, the Utah Supreme Court concluded: 
[I]t is well established that general principles of contract law govern accord 
and satisfaction, and that under those principles, a written offer may be 
contained in one or more documents, such as a check and separate letter. 
Id at 326 (internal citations omitted). Thus, the court concluded Mountain Bell tendered 
payment in full settlement of the disputed amount. 
Similarly, in the present case, under cover of letter dated October 5, 2001, 
Hardesty sent ECO a check in the amount of $3,394.72. Hardesty's letter clearly and 
unambiguously represented that the enclosed check constituted "full and final payment, 
satisfying all conditions existing between" ECO and Hardesty. See R. at 16 & 32. 
Further, Hardesty wrote: "Endorsement and deposit of full and final payment indicates a 
full release of interests and liabilities" between ECO and Hardesty. Id. Under these 
facts, it is beyond argument that Hardesty tendered payment in full settlement of the 
entire dispute and, therefore, as ECO concedes, the second accord and satisfaction 
element is satisfied. 
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C. Appellant Accepted Payment in Settlement of Disputed Amount 
The final element of an accord and satisfaction is acceptance of the payment 
tendered in full settlement of the entire disputed amount. Estate Landscape, 884 P.2d at 
325; Dishinger, 2001 UT App 209 at If 19, 47 P.3d at 80; see also UTAH CODE ANN. 
§ 70A-3-311(1). In Estate Landscape, the supreme court clearly explained that cashing a 
check tendered in full settlement of a disputed amount constitutes acceptance as a matter 
of law: 
Where, as here, the check is tendered under the condition that negotiation 
will constitute full settlement, mere negotiation of the check constitutes the 
accord, regardless of the payee's efforts or intent to negate the condition. 
844 P.2d at 330 (emphasis added). The court also highlighted two separate cases in 
which creditors tried to reverse or took exception to debtors' restrictive endorsements, 
and yet accord and satisfaction resulted in both cases when the objecting creditors cashed 
the tendered checks: 
In both cases, the creditors' conduct reveals a subjective intent not to accept 
the lower payment as full discharge of their claims. However, because they 
negotiated the checks, their subjective objections were irrelevant. Their 
options were to accept the checks on their debtors' terms or to refrain from 
negotiating the checks and seek the entire sums through the judicial 
process. 
Id. (citing Marton Remodeling v. Jensen, 706 P.2d 607, 608 (Utah 1985); Cove View 
Excavating & Constr. v. Flynn, 758 P.2d 474, 478 (Utah Ct. App. 1988)). 
By negotiating and cashing Hardesty's check, ECO accepted payment as a matter 
of law. Under the above-cited cases, Appellant's unilateral attempt to conditionally 
endorse Hardesty's check prior to negotiation is of no consequence. Upon its receipt of 
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Hardesty's letter and check, ECO had two options: (1) cash the check and thereby accept 
the settlement terms under which it was tendered, or (2) seek judicial relief for the entire 
amount it claimed to be owed. See Estate Landscape, 844 P.2d at 330 (noting in such 
scenarios, creditors' "options were to accept the checks on their debtors' terms or to 
refrain from negotiating the checks and seek the entire sums through the judicial 
process"). By cashing the check, ECO agreed to the accord and satisfaction as a matter 
of law. Id ("Estate Landscape's negotiation of the check constituted acceptance of the 
accord and satisfaction as a matter of law."); cf UTAH CODE ANN. § 70A-3-311(1) & (2) 
(2001). 
Indeed, this Court has already answered ECO's plea for a "declaration" that its 
"negotiation [of the check]—in any form, regardless of communications to the contrary— 
imputes acceptance of Hardesty's terms as a matter of law." Brief of Appellant at 9. In 
Dishinger v. Potter, citing the supreme court's unambiguous declaration that "mere 
negotiation of the check constitutes the accord, regardless of the payee's efforts or intent 
to negate the condition," Estate Landscape, 844 P.2d at 330, this Court squarely agreed 
that "[w]hat is said is overridden by what is done, and assent is imputed as an inference 
of law." 47 P.3d at 82 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted, alteration in 
original). Thus, ECO need look no further than the consistent, clear and unambiguous 
opinions of both this Court and the Utah Supreme Court that hold the negotiation of a 
check tendered in full settlement of a disputed amount constitutes an accord and 
satisfaction as a matter of law. 
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III. Hardesty is Entitled to Attorney Fees and Costs Incurred on Appeal 
Under Rule 33 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, a party is entitled to an 
award of its attorney fees and costs incurred on appeal where "the court determines that a 
motion made or appeal taken under these rules is either frivolous or for delay." UTAH R. 
APP. P. 33(a) (2002). Here, a frivolous appeal is defined as one "that is not grounded in 
fact, not warranted by existing law, or not based on a good faith argument to extend, 
modify or reverse existing law." UTAH R. APP. P. 33(b). Meanwhile, the rules consider 
an appeal as interposed for the purpose of delay where it is filed "for any improper 
purpose such as to harass [or] cause needless increase in the cost of litigation." Id. 
As argued hereinabove, the facts of this case and Utah law compel a single 
conclusion—the parties reached an accord and satisfaction. ECO's appeal of the trial 
court's Order dismissing ECO's Complaint presents only one issue: whether ECO's 
reserved negotiation of Hardesty's check constituted acceptance of the check as full 
settlement of the parties' dispute. See Brief of Appellant at 1-2; Docketing Statement at 
3, If 8. This question was clearly and unambiguously answered by the Utah Supreme 
Court in both Estate Landscape, 844 P.2d at 330, and Marton Remodeling, 706 P.2d at 
608, and by the Utah Court of Appeals in both Dishinger v. Potter, 47 P.3d at 82 and 
Cove View Excavating, 758 P.2d at 478. Indeed, the answer to ECO's contrived issue 
cannot be more clearly stated: 
Where, as here, the check is tendered under the condition that 
negotiation will constitute full settlement, mere negotiation of the check 
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constitutes the accord, regardless of the payee's efforts or intent to negate 
the condition. 
844 P.2d at 330 (emphasis added). 
Thus, ECO's lamenting about "imbalances under the law" (Brief of Appellant at 
6) and ECO's arguments about accounts receivable being held hostage and the purported 
inability of Utah businesses to function without a "clear understanding of whether 
inadequate payment can ever be accepted as partial payment" (Docketing Statement at 3) 
simply ignore well-established legislative and judicial statements of the law of accord and 
satisfaction. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 70A-3-311(l). Indeed, Appellant merely attempts 
to manufacture a legal issue by stating, 
ECO Marketing must be able to decide, without coercion and after 
communicating its intentions to the debtor, whether it may tackle the risks 
of attempting to collect legitimate debts. 
Brief of Appellant at 6. In fact, ECO had the opportunity to attempt to collect on 
Hardesty's purported debt, but instead chose to accept the terms of Hardesty's settlement 
offer by negotiating his check. Indeed, after a thorough review of the Utah Supreme 
Court's unmistakable affirmation of this conclusion in Estate Landscape, this Court not 
only "suggested" such a rule, it clearly stated: 
Therefore, because Potter negotiated the check, which was tendered by the 
Dishingers in fell satisfaction of the disputed amount of the base monthly 
rent, the fact that Potter at the same time brought an action for breach of 
lease and unlawful detainer is of no legal consequence. The third and final 
element of accord and satisfaction was established by Potter's conduct. 
Dishinger, 2001 UT App 209 at 1f 27, 47 P.3d at 82. This conclusion follows directly 
from, and is consistent with, the supreme court's review of two similar cases in which 
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creditors attempted to negate debtors' restrictive endorsements and then cashed checks 
tendered in full settlement of disputed amounts: 
In both cases, the creditors' conduct reveals a subjective intent not to accept 
the lower payment as full discharge of their claims. However, because they 
negotiated the checks, their subjective objections were irrelevant. Their 
options were to accept the checks on their debtors' terms or to refrain from 
negotiating the checks and seek the entire sums through the judicial 
process. 
Estate Landscape, 844 P.2d at 330 (citing Marton Remodeling v. Jensen, 706 P.2d 607, 
608 (Utah 1985) & Cove View Excavating & Constr. v. Flynn, 758 P.2d 474, 478 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1988)). In light of Estate Landscape, Marton Remodeling, Cove View 
Excavating and Dishinger, it is abundantly obvious that ECO's appeal is not grounded in 
fact, is not warranted by existing law, and does not present a good faith argument to 
extend, modify or reverse existing law. Rather, the appeal has needlessly increased the 
cost of this litigation for Hardesty. Based on these factors, Hardesty is entitled to an 
award of his attorney fees and costs incurred on appeal. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, it is beyond argument that all elements of an accord and 
satisfaction were satisfied in this matter. There was a bona fide dispute between the 
parties over the amount owed by Hardesty to ECO; Hardesty tendered payment in full 
settlement of the entire disputed amount; and ECO accepted Hardesty's tender by cashing 
his check. Under Utah law, ECO's attempts to unilaterally change the terms of 
Hardesty9s tender of payment are of no consequence. Therefore, the trial court properly 
granted Hardesty's motion to dismiss ECO's Complaint and this Court should affirm the 
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trial court's Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order dismissing ECO's 
Complaint. Further, because there is no legal or factual basis for ECO's appeal, Hardesty 
is entitled to the entry of an order awarding attorney fees and costs to Hardesty from 
ECO. 
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